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Queering it Right, Getting it Wrong
HECTOR KOLLIAS
Abstract:
This article seeks to interrogate the moment of queer theory’s ‘birth’ out of
French influences, or what is designated by the umbrella term ‘French Theory’.
It specifically points to the operations of transformation and dislocation,
subversion and perversion of French theoretical influences at work in two
distinctive ‘pairings’ of French ‘progenitor’ and American queer ‘offspring’:
Jacques Derrida with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Jacques Lacan with Judith
Butler.
Keywords: French theory, queer theory, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida,
Jacques Lacan, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Judith Butler
Introduction: Axiomatic
This essay proposes that many of the major critical discourses on
identity and sexuality that came to be organized under the term queer
theory in the US in the early 1990s are structured by a movement
of appropriation and dislocation of a few key elements taken from
theoretical discourses developed in France since the 1960s. Queer
theory is one of the many offspring of what came to be called
‘French Theory’, its siblings including ‘Yale school’ textual criticism
and postcolonial theory. But the metaphor of birth and parentage,
though instructive in some respects and strategically useful as historical
gloss, is an inadequate description of the processes taking place, not
only in the formation of queer theory (or any of its other siblings)
from French primary material, but in the transformation of a disparate
collection of French ideas, texts and proper names symbolizing them
into the concept ‘French Theory’. François Cusset, in a book of that
title, maps the history of this transformation in an exemplary way,
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taking in the various historical and political contexts that mark the
cultural exchange between France and American academia.1 I do not
wish to retell this history; rather I want to focus on a specific argument
about the transmission of ideas between different national contexts
which I shall take as axiomatic, namely that in this transmission ‘one
can speak of a “structural misunderstanding” [a notion Cusset takes
from Bourdieu], not in the sense of a misreading, an error, a betrayal
of some original, but in the sense of a highly productive transfer of
words and concepts from one specific market of symbolic goods to
another’ (xiv–xv).
My aim is to take this axiom and examine how it functions in the
moment when queer theory first came to be articulated as such, and
more precisely to examine the ways in which French influences have
been worked through, twisted, repudiated in two specific Franco-
American pairings: Derrida and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick; and Lacan
and Judith Butler. These pairings are not arbitrary, but I do not wish
to suggest they hold some essential key to understanding the process of
transformation from French to queer theory. Although Cusset does not
himself provide such explicit links, I take these pairings to conform to
his diagnosis of a particular moment in the story of ‘French Theory’.
As Cusset’s narrative goes:
Following the carefree anarcho-poetic textualism of the seventies, and alongside
the literary purism of Derrida’s Yale followers, the conservative revolution of
the Reagan years provoked the return of the repressed: the notorious referent,
evacuated by these formalistic versions of French theory, made a sudden comeback
under the name of identity politics. This was heart-warming news for all those who
had given up hope of penetrating the black box—French theory had a focus
after all, and it was none other than unearthing minority identities, and the lot
of subjugated groups, whose very existence was being threatened by a reactionary
hydra. (131–2)
Cusset’s rather inflated rhetoric does at least have the benefit of
succinctly placing the meeting between French theory and American
identity politics in a political and historical context. And it seems to
me undeniable that it is from exactly that context and that meeting
that queer theory was born. The pairings I have chosen to discuss
all exemplify the process whereby queer theory was born out of the
political need to bring radical French anti-humanist thought to bear
upon issues of identity. It would be very difficult to suggest that
Foucault, Derrida or Lacan shared a common political orientation,
let alone a political agenda, but their thought was forcefully and
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successfully used by Sedgwick, Butler and many others in the services
of common queer political ends. The vague French appellation ‘la
pensée soixante-huit’ is nowhere near as politically concrete as what
is designated by the term queer. Despite obvious and unavoidable
differences of opinion, despite divergent political affiliations over a
twenty-year history, queer theory shares an agenda, one that seeks to
subvert and problematize notions of identity, beginning with sexual
identity, and one which has been repeated tirelessly through this long
history. I shall argue that the parentage of queer theory’s political
concerns lies with the French names already mentioned. What happens
to the ideas and the theories associated with these names when they
are passed on to the queer generation and mapped on to its political
agenda is the main question I am seeking to address. But, as has also
endlessly been shown, I must also concede that the key inspiration, the
key parental figure, is Michel Foucault, whose presence is inexorably
marked in the writings of Butler and Sedgwick, but who, for that very
reason, figures as a more readily avowed parentage whose significance
can, indeed, be taken as ‘axiomatic’.
Epistemology after Metaphysics
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet is a pivotal moment
in the history of queer theory, often credited with kick-starting it all.2
The presence of Foucault is here unmistakable and the arguments of
the book rest squarely upon an assumption of the theories of the first
volume of A History of Sexuality:
in accord with Foucault’s demonstration, whose results I take to be axiomatic,
that modern Western culture has placed what it calls sexuality in a more and
more distinctively privileged relation to our most prized constructs of individual
identity, truth, and knowledge, it becomes truer and truer that the language of
sexuality not only intersects with but transforms the other languages and relations
by which we know. (3)
It would be worth worrying about how the ‘demonstration’ offered
by Foucault’s arguments can be taken as axiomatic but my focus here
will not be directly on Foucault and his indisputable influence. The
second, equally glaring French theoretical presence in Sedgwick’s book
is Jacques Derrida. Or rather, it is deconstruction and its cognates,
most usually the adjective ‘deconstructive’ applied as description of
Sedgwick’s strategy, which form the crux of a series of negotiations
starting with the famous opening sentence: ‘Epistemology of the Closet
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proposes that many of the major nodes of thought and knowledge in
twentieth-century Western culture as a whole are structured— indeed,
fractured—by a chronic, now endemic crisis of homo/heterosexual
definition.’ (1) The very form of that sentence already prefigures the
ways deconstruction will be used and dislocated in the rest of the
book. On the one hand, the reliance on the binary opposition and the
sleight of hand with which ‘structured’ becomes ‘fractured’ are both
familiar instances of Derridean rhetoric; on the other, the focus on
‘twentieth-century Western culture’, and the narrativizing emphasis
of ‘chronic, now endemic’ point to an operation which should be
called historicizing, placing a stress on particular historical horizons.
It is the conjunction of this historicizing tendency, demonstrably
originating in Foucault, alongside the given field of ‘nodes of thought
and knowledge’, with the deconstructive strategy that will concern
me here.
From the very first sentence, then, it becomes clear that Sedgwick’s
use of ‘deconstruction’ and ‘deconstructive’ is restricted to the analysis
of what she calls ‘binarisms’, and to showing the effect that these
have on modes of knowledge. This is indeed a restriction but I
am not trying to indict Sedgwick with the crime of falsifying
deconstruction, simply because that is not in the least interesting.
What is interesting is what this restriction, or even reduction, this
particularization of deconstruction as strategy yields. And my point
here will be that the stress on ‘binarisms’ is exactly the kind of
narrowing of focus that will allow deconstruction arguably to become,
after Foucauldian discourse analysis, the second major tool in the
toolbox of queer theory. When Sedgwick first makes an appeal to the
term ‘deconstructive’ to characterize ‘one main strand of the argument
in this book’ (9), she identifies the deconstruction of binaries, giving
a succinct general demonstration of the strategy, as something that
is already a given critical topos, an understanding of deconstruction
as a strategy that we can all share, as it has already been in use for
many years in the academic context. Here is the brief definition of
the strategy:
The analytic move it [the deconstructive argument] makes is to demonstrate
that categories presented in a culture as symmetrical binary oppositions—
heterosexual/homosexual in this case— actually subsist in a more unsettled and
dynamic tacit relation according to which, first, term B is not symmetrical with
but subordinated to term A; but second, the valorized term A actually depends
for its meaning on the simultaneous subsumption and exclusion of term B; hence,
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third, the question of priority between the supposed central and the supposed
marginal category of each dyad is irresolvably unstable, an instability caused by
the fact that term B is constituted as at once internal and external to term A.
(9–10, emphasis mine)
There is no faulting the logic of presentation, or the accuracy of
argument here. But there is also, clearly discernible in the phrase
‘categories presented in a culture’, the mark of the particularization
I referred to earlier. Derrida’s first forays into the kind of strategic
analysis Sedgwick presents here are to do with the logic of the sign
in Husserl’s phenomenology and with the major elision of writing
under speech in the history of Western philosophy.3 Particularly
in Of Grammatology the context in which such a deconstructive
strategy operates is that of the deconstruction of what Derrida calls
logocentrism or ‘the metaphysics of presence’ and, crucially, that
context is not that of a culture but rather of the entire history of Western
philosophy. The logical and epistemic reach of Derrida’s project, as was
surely not lost on either ‘friendly’ appropriators like Sedgwick or its
many detractors, is a markedly and significantly universal one, if by
universal we at least understand the entire history of Western thought
from ancient Greece to the present. This universal horizon is lost in
Sedgwick’s account of deconstruction and, I would suggest, with it
are lost the philosophical concerns of Derrida’s work, down to the
very non-concept of différance that is the motor behind the logic of
opposition Sedgwick outlines.
In this way, one of the most general binaries operating in Sedgwick’s
argument, the binary knowledge/ignorance is of a manifestly different
order from the Derridean opposition absence/presence or even
speech/writing. Sedgwick effectively allows that when she writes:
Insofar as ignorance is ignorance of a knowledge—a knowledge that may itself,
it goes without saying, be seen as either true or false under some other regime
of truth— these ignorances (. . .) are produced by and correspond to particular
knowledges and circulate as part of particular regimes of truth. (8)
Unmistakably, the deconstructive strategy of analysing binarisms has
been altered, enhanced, by Sedgwick’s avowed allegiance to Foucault’s
project of analysing ‘particular regimes of truth’. Sedgwick moves
from the general horizon of the deconstruction of binaries to the
historicizing and particularizing aim of analyzing their ‘power effects’,
as she explains: ‘[the argument] will move through a deconstructive
description of the instability of the binarism itself, (. . .) toward an
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examination of the resulting definitional incoherence: its functional
potential and realization, its power effects (. . .)’ (92).
This particularizing process can be seen at work even (or perhaps
especially), in Sedgwick’s famous substitution of the antinomy be-
tween ‘essentialist’ and ‘constructivist’ accounts of sexuality with the
antinomy between what she calls ‘universalizing’ and ‘minoritizing’
views. Ross Chambers has argued that ‘the analysis of the closet as
an institution that arises from the incoherence of twentieth century
perceptions of homosexuality that are simultaneously minoritizing and
universalizing is an analysis that can only be made on constructivist
(not essentialist) assumptions’, thereby effectively aligning ‘construc-
tivism’ with what I have called the particularized or historicized
‘application’ of deconstruction.4 Chambers suggests that Sedgwick’s
move ‘could certainly be described as substituting a certain decon-
structive constructivism for the Foucault version of constructivism’,
since ‘if the incoherence that Sedgwick discerns (. . .) is, as she says,
“irreducible”, it is because such incoherence is a consequence of
the cultural practice of sorting people into kinds that are in differential
relation one with the other’ (168, my emphasis). But if this is con-
structivism, it is certainly not deconstructive, at least not in the sense in
which Derrida himself articulates the notion of elements being in dif-
ferential relation one with the other, this articulation being something
far removed from ‘cultural practice’. Here is how Derrida puts it:
The presence of an element is always a signifying and substitutive reference
inscribed in a system of differences and the movement of a chain. Play is always
play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought of radically, play must
be conceived of before the alternative of presence and absence. Being must be
considered as presence or absence on the basis of the possibility of play and not
the other way around.5
The ‘cultural practice of sorting people into kinds’ is already
a particularized version of Derrida’s ‘system of differences’; the
deconstructive moves that Sedgwick makes, whether ‘constructivist’
or not, function only and programmatically within a historical horizon
circumscribed by ‘culture’. In other words, this is not Foucault giving
way to Derrida as source of Sedgwick’s argumentative manoeuvres;
this is the Derridean horizon circumscribed by Foucauldian notions of
history and culture. In this version of Derrida the centred structure that
proves to have no centre is a historically circumscribed structure, play
is merely historically constituted, not the (non-) foundation of ontology
as such.
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This goes hand in hand with Sedgwick’s avowed mistrust of the
universalizing tendencies of a theory that would have a reach beyond
the specific historical and cultural horizons under investigation:
‘A point of the book is not to know how far its insights and projects
are generalizable, not to be able to say in advance where the semantic
specificity of these issues gives over to (or: itself structures?) the syntax
of a “broader” or more abstractable critical project’ (12). In Derridean
shorthand one might say, ‘this is therefore an ontic investigation’,
that is to say, it is an investigation concerned with the claims to
knowledge and power of a particular regime of truth organized around
the central concept/antinomy of the closet. And it is an investigation
almost synonymous with, or paradigmatic of, the critical enterprise
of queer theory. Queer theory’s version of deconstruction is, to
put it bluntly, to substitute ‘sexuality’ for ‘metaphysics’. Sedgwick’s
undertaking in Epistemology of the Closet will be indefatigably to subvert
the epistemological binarisms governing discourses on sexuality, but
it will inevitably stop well short of the painstaking deconstruction
that points towards something other than the discourses of sexuality, as
with ‘the trace’ or ‘archi-writing’ that Derrida shows function in
logocentrism as its effective deconstruction. Just as Foucault’s project is
to situate historically a discursive domain and analyse its power effects,
Sedgwick interrogates the closet as ‘regime of truth’ for its own power
effects, with no ‘grand’ intention of deconstructing the closet.
Derrida has often claimed to have been ‘misunderstood’ as
addressing the domain of language, discourse or culture—but Derrida
was not a queer theorist. And once this particularizing, historicizing
reduction of deconstruction has been performed, in fact because it is
performed, queer theory as Sedgwick practices it can begin. Sedgwick
would have rightly insisted that what I have been describing as
reduction or particularization is not only not the wrong move to
make, but that it is the right, or the queer move to make. This is
because Sedgwick foresees her own argument as being ‘the theorized
prescription for a practical politics implicit in these readings’ (13). And
this prescription is ‘for a multi-pronged movement whose idealist and
materialist impulses, whose minority-model and universalist-model
strategies (. . .) would likewise proceed in parallel without any high
premium placed on ideological rationalization between them’ (13).
This is a bottom-up model where politics itself dictates the ‘multi-
pronged’ movement of a ‘prescription’ for politics whose ideological
or theoretical impurity is its strength and not its weakness. In this way,
remaining faithful to the theoretical élan of deconstruction is viewed as
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suspect: ‘Deconstruction, founded as a very science of différ(e/a)nce, has
both so fetishized the idea of difference and so vaporized its possible
embodiments that its most thoroughgoing practitioners are the last
people to whom one would now look for help in thinking about
particular differences’ (23). In search of these ‘particular differences’,
and in defence of them, Sedgwick has to sustain ‘embodied’ difference,
and to assert, as her first ‘axiom’ goes, that ‘people are different from
each other’ (22). As a proposition this is as far removed from the logic
and the legacy of deconstruction as it could possibly be.
After giving a long list of ‘things that can differentiate people of
identical gender, race, nationality, class, and “sexual orientation” ’(25),
a list which, if read with a Derridean universalizing focus
would look hopelessly individualizing and almost intended to
make theoretical intervention impossible, she writes: ‘To alienate
conclusively, definitionally, from anyone on any theoretical ground the
authority to describe and name their own sexual desire is a terribly
consequential seizure’ (26). And a few lines later: ‘The safer proceeding
would seem to be to give as much credence as one finds it conceivable
to give to self-reports of sexual difference—weighting one’s credence,
when it is necessary to weight it at all, in favour of the less normative
and therefore riskier, costlier self-reports’ (26). More than twenty
years of queer theory have demonstrated the enormous sway such
pronouncements have; they read almost like a credo, which is why they
rightly belong to a section of her work Sedgwick terms ‘axiomatic’.
At the same time though, such a credo is completely unimaginable
within the context of ‘French Theory’. Radical anti-humanism as
promoted by the French ‘masters’, including Foucault and Derrida,
would have absolutely no truck with the notion of ‘self-report’, not
to mention the seemingly entirely pragmatic preference for ‘riskier,
costlier’ ones. In the end, I take these ‘axiomatic’ pronouncements to
be emblematic if not definitional of queer theory precisely in that they
seek to put the ‘science of différ(e/a)nce’ in the service of particular
differences, thereby seeking not to interrogate but to shore up the
practical and theoretical intelligibility of any, and that means all, sexual
differences.
Real Trouble
Judith Butler is arguably the figure most would associate with the
investigation of ways in which theoretical and practical intelligibility
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is or is not bestowed upon sexual difference. From Gender Trouble via
Bodies that Matter, The Psychic Life of Power, through to her part in the
co-authored Contingency, Hegemony, Universality and Antigone’s Claim
she has interrogated categories of both gender and sexuality in an effort
to think the ways in which marginal or less normative identifications
or ‘self-reports’ can be intelligible or are not allowed to be so.6 Her
work is complex, challenging and evolving in ways I cannot hope to
do justice to in this essay. Nor am I able, unfortunately, to restrict my
investigation into only one of her books because of, on the one hand,
the evolution and complexity I just mentioned, and, on the other, my
choice of ‘pairing’ with her. Butler is also indebted to Foucault and
to Derrida in her own influential theoretical interventions, and, due
perhaps to the fact that she also trained as a philosopher, she is less likely
to be found dislocating the philosophical paradigms handed down by
the French—with one notable exception: Jacques Lacan. Choosing
Lacan to ‘pair’ with Butler is a difficult enterprise for three principal
interrelated sets of reasons:
1) Because her engagement with Lacan is constant in the period I
shall be investigating; constant but evolving, and it is this evolution that
I shall seek to interrogate. Were I to confine myself to looking only at,
say, Gender Trouble, particularly important elements of this engagement
would not have been accounted for.
2) Because alongside Lacan one has to contend with the legacy of
psychoanalysis as a whole, as a theory and as a mode of discourse
that centres around issues of sexuality and which effectively forms
an alternative approach to such issues— alternative, that is, to queer
theory, which has more often than not been its worst enemy. The
story of that animosity is far too complex to go into in any detail in
the space available here.7
3) As a corollary to this, when Butler engages with Lacan she
engages not only with Freud, of course, but, significantly, with
Lacanian thinkers such as Slavoj Žižek. I shall have no recourse to
Butler’s analysis and queering of Freud, to my mind one of the most
brilliant thought-experiments in all of queer theory, and I shall have
to take the ‘dialogue’ with Žižek implicitly as a dialogue with Lacan,
with the obvious risk of reductionism that this brings.
So why choose Lacan? To anticipate what follows, however much
Butler’s engagement with him may have proved to be a dead-end (or
not), it is the way the engagement is conducted, the way Lacan is
repudiated or, to use psychoanalytic terminology, disavowed in Butler’s
writings that has something of consequence to tell us about the queer
reception and transformation of another key player in ‘French Theory’.
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The major points of divergence and disagreement between Butler
and Lacan and his followers are organized around three closely
interrelated concepts in Lacanian theory. The first is the notion of
sexual difference itself, which Lacan understands as real, which in his
sense means unavailable to symbolization and signification, beyond the
domain of discourse.8 The second problem is about the signifier that
Lacan upholds as the very signifier of sexual difference, the phallus. At
least on the surface Butler has good reason to be worried about this
notion, not because she conflates the phallus as signifier with the penis
as organ, but because the phallus seems, in Lacanian theory, to be a
privileged signifier whose power is such that assuming any kind of sexual
identity depends on one’s relation to it. The third problem concerns
the status of the Lacanian real, and therefore of sexual difference
as real, and of the status, real or not, of the phallus as ‘agent’ of
signification. The real is the unsymbolizable, but does it have a specific
content? Butler asks whether what is said to be foreclosed in the real
actually corresponds to sexual identity, in an indirect critique of Lacan’s
famous aphorism, ‘woman does not exist’ (la femme n’existe pas).9
These problems are, as I said, interrelated and in essence inseparable; so
proceeding, even for the sake of argumentative strategy, to discuss them
separately will inevitably result in their intermingling. Nevertheless,
I propose that my interrogation of Butler’s engagement with Lacan
moves from ‘arguing with the Real’, through the signification of the
phallus towards the (non)meaning of sexual difference in order to
gauge what is consequential in Butler’s sustained ‘battle’ with Lacanian
psychoanalysis.
To begin with, from a Lacanian point of view, as Butler is acutely
aware and as it has been indefatigably argued by her critics, to
‘argue with the real’ is not possible. Arguing is definitionally a
kind of discourse and, in the case of Butler’s essay ‘Arguing with
the Real’ (BTM, 187–222), it is writing about/against the real,
attempting to reconfigure the real in writing. Lacan aphoristically
denies absolutely this endeavour: first, because ‘we would be led to
define the real as the impossible’, and because the real is that ‘which
doesn’t stop not being written’.10 Butler stubbornly refuses to accept
this as a given, a psychoanalytic axiom, because in her view this
poses an insurmountable limit to the possibilities of intelligibility for
subjective positions, always bringing back the subject and its possible
reconfigurations to the same limit, seen as normative and prohibitive:
On the one hand, we are to accept that ‘the Real’ means nothing other than
the constitutive limit of the subject; yet on the other hand, why is it that any
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effort to refer to the constitutive limit of the subject in ways that do not use that
nomenclature are considered a failure to understand its proper operation? Are we
using the categories to explain the phenomena, or marshalling the phenomena to
shore up the categories, ‘in the name of the Father’, if you will? (CHU, 152)
The real, in Butler’s sense, is a marker for that which cannot enter into
symbolic communication, intelligibility and exchange because it is not
allowed to, and psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity and sexuality that
utilize the notion of the real are automatically understood as normative
and prohibitive. This aligns with her argument, from Gender Trouble
onwards, that the prohibition of incest, posited in psychoanalysis as the
taboo yielding the formation of sexual and gender identity through
the threat of castration, is inconceivable without a concomitant
prohibition of homosexuality.11 To subvert the constitution of the
real, Butler deploys a formidable argument casting Žižek’s Lacanian
defence of the real as inscrutable and therefore unapproachable by
the discursive strategies of queer or feminist reasonings as in itself a
normative fall-back to a defensive and prohibitive position: ‘If the
“threat” of castration [which in Lacanian theory is connected to
trauma, and to the real] is to be protected, what then does the threat
of castration secure?’ (BTM, 197). As Sarah Kay puts it in her discussion
of the debate between Žižek and Butler that began with ‘Arguing
with the Real’: ‘for Butler, the real is not “sexual difference”, but
“prohibited sexualities”.’12 I would add that it is not just ‘prohibited
sexualities’ but, in accordance with Butler’s formulation of gender
identity as iteration and performativity, the status of gender that
is here contested. Writing about the Lacanian formula whereby
‘woman does not exist’, Butler sees in it another prohibition,
another relegation of a gendered position into the unsymbolizable of
the real:
Such a view not only reifies women as the lost referent, that which cannot exist;
and feminism, as the vain effort to resist that particular proclamation of the law
(a form of psychosis in speech, a resistance to penis envy). To call into question
women as the privileged figure for ‘the lost referent’, however, is precisely to recast
that description as a possible signification, and to open the term as a site for a more
expansive rearticulation. (BTM, 218)
It could be argued, as Butler herself has done, that these questionings of
the intractability of the real, and these attempts at reformulating what
counts as the constitutive limit of the subject are politically valuable and
necessary despite any protestations of violating Lacanian orthodoxy.
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But, as we shall see, Butler’s refusal to take the Lacanian real for what
it is results in other, more significant ‘structural misunderstandings’.
If the Lacanian real is to be contested because of its perception as
normative and prohibitive exclusion, then the Lacanian phallus, the
easily masculinized signifier that governs sexual identification, is an
even more appealing target. Feminists had already taken issue with
the centrality of that concept to Lacan’s theories of the subject, but
what is perhaps surprising is that Butler does not propose to abandon
the phallus but rather to reconfigure it, or, if you like, to queer it, in a
gesture typical of her engagement with Lacan as a whole. She offers the
extraordinary conception of ‘the lesbian phallus’ as antidote to Lacan’s
‘phallogocentrism’:
The lesbian phallus may be said to intervene as an unexpected consequence of the
Lacanian scheme, an apparently contradictory signifier which, through a critical
mimesis, calls into question the ostensibly originating and controlling power of the
Lacanian phallus, indeed, its installation as the privileged signifier of the symbolic
order. (BTM, 73)
Without going into the detail of this interrogation, I would summarize
Butler’s position as an attempt to debunk the potency of the phallus as
‘privileged signifier of the symbolic order’ by showing that its potency
is an after-effect of its imaginary reification and coronation as privileged
signifier: ‘what operates under the sign of the symbolic may be nothing
other than precisely that set of imaginary effects which have become
naturalized and reified as the law of signification’ (BTM, 79). In this
way Butler has hit upon an element intrinsic to Lacanian theory,
namely that the symbolic order of language and nomination is always
constituted as an after-effect, or, as Lacan would say, après-coup. Despite
her intention to subvert the phallus, her own subversion is an astute
demonstration of the operation whereby the phallus comes to be
‘installed’ as the ‘privileged signifier’: ‘The phallus would then emerge
as a symptom, and its authority could be established only through
a metaleptic reversal of cause and effect. Rather than the postulated
origin of signification or the signifiable, the phallus would be the effect
of a signifying chain summarily suppressed’ (BTM, 81).
Has Butler therefore managed to ‘prove Lacan right’ even as her
effort was to subvert the centrality of the phallic concept? Well, not
exactly. She is certainly ‘right’, if by that we mean she is reading
Lacan straight, in pointing out that the seemingly omnipotent position
of the phallus as a signifier in the symbolic order is the result of
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an après-coup. But her insistence on the phallus being a necessarily
masculine and heterosexist conception is not supported by a reading
of Lacan and therefore her attempt to subvert it as the privileged
signifier controlling sexual difference is unwarranted. For Lacan, and
despite the fact that he does hold on to the overdetermined name
‘phallus’, the phallus is a singular signifier burdened with the function
of signifying the failure of signification. He famously equates it with
the square root of minus one, an imaginary number, not to be found
in nature (not, therefore, the penis), but which has effects on the
series of significations performed by ‘real’ numbers.13 This has at least
two consequences for Butler’s argument. The first is that her own
subversion of the phallus as imaginary reification is precisely what
Lacan intends by equating the phallus to an imaginary number: the
symbolic order, and the phallus that is ‘installed’ at its centre is still
able to signify because of an imaginary effect. The phallus as cause
is the effect of the phallus as effect.14 Secondly, and since the reason
Butler finds it necessary to subvert the Lacanian phallus is to debunk
its presumed status as masculine privileged signifier, it is illegitimate
to presume that a signifier with the singular status of the imaginary
number can have a masculine or a feminine determination, despite
the persistence of the term. It would be truer to argue, with Joan
Copjec, that ‘the peculiarity, or singularity, of the phallic signifier is
due precisely to the fact that it ruins the possibility of any simple
affirmation or negation.’15 In other words: the phallus is precisely the
signifier that founds sexual difference, not as ‘natural’ and given, but as
impossible, that is to say, as real.16
We’re back with that impossible notion, then. As I mentioned
earlier, what bugs Butler about the real is not only its intractability,
the fact that, as Lacan says, ‘the real is always in its place’, but the
fact that one of the things, if not the chief ‘thing’, accounted for
as real in Lacanian theory is sexual difference. In a reading of the
theory of sexuation emerging from Lacan’s Seminar XX, Butler sees
the opportunity to reveal sexual identity as constructed:
the construction of a coherent sexual identity along the disjunctive axis of the
feminine/masculine is bound to fail; the disruptions of this coherence through
the inadvertent reemergence of the repressed reveal not only that “identity”
is constructed, but that the prohibition that constructs identity is inefficacious
(the paternal law ought to be understood not as a deterministic divine will, but
as a perpetual bumbler, preparing the ground for the insurrections against him).
(GT, 38)
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Butler in effect uses Lacan, entirely against the grain, to support her
extraordinary insight that gender identification is the result of what
she calls ‘the heterosexual matrix’, itself founded on an originary
repudiation of primary bisexuality. ‘Sexual difference’ is thus shown
to be a discursive determination which grounds the heterosexual
matrix and looks back on originary bisexuality as that which requires
mourning in order for the fixed heterosexual gender positions to arise:
From the start, however, the binary restriction on sexuality shows clearly that
culture in no way postdates the bisexuality that it purports to repress: it constitutes
the matrix of intelligibility through which primary bisexuality itself becomes
thinkable. The ‘bisexuality’ that is posited as a psychic foundation and is said to
be repressed at a later date is a discursive production that claims to be prior to all
discourse, effected through the compulsory and generative practices of normative
heterosexuality. (GT, 69–70)
This certainly constitutes a reading of what Lacan means by sexual
difference; but by eliding (before going on in later texts to ‘argue with’)
the order of the real, Butler is able to conceive of Lacanian theory as
necessarily normative, as making out of sexual difference an intractable
Law (a Law which is, in agreement with Lacanian terminology,
Symbolic), and therefore a Law which, although presented in Lacanian
discourse as unshakeable, can and ought to be reconfigured along the
discursive lines she reveals:
It is clearly not enough to claim that this drama holds for Western, late capitalist
household dwellers and that perhaps in some yet to be defined epoch some other
Symbolic regime will govern the language of sexual ontology. By instituting the
Symbolic as invariably phantasmatic, the ‘invariably’ wanders into an ‘inevitably’,
generating a description of sexuality in terms that promote cultural stasis as its
result. (GT, 71)
Butler thus sees in the Lacanian ‘law’ of sexual difference a site which
avowedly calls itself a failure, but whose failure is incapable of being
rendered into anything other than perpetual failure, with no possible
strategy for resisting or overcoming that failure.
A step back is necessary here, before proceeding to see why this
is a misconstrual of the Lacanian notion of sexual difference and,
more importantly, what kind of misconstrual it is. The vocabulary
of ‘resistance’ most clearly, but also of ‘matrix of intelligibility’, or
even ‘cultural stasis’, is a distinctly Foucauldian vocabulary, and the
project Butler sets out for her arguments is the Foucauldian one of
locating the matrices of power and implicated resistance operating in
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the domain of discourses on sexuality. Again, the background of this
American queer debate is to be found in another debate that could
be called ‘Foucault against psychoanalysis’, the details and history of
which are far too intricate to engage with here.17 But, despite the fact
that this Foucauldian vocabulary is not as explicit in Bodies that Matter,
it becomes clear that her entire project relies upon the possibility of
discussing sexuality, including the psychoanalytic conception of sexuality, as
a mode of discourse which ought to allow, as the flip side of its own
power-effects, the possibility of resistance to it. This is why, in what
I take to be Butler’s last sustained encounter with Lacan in Antigone’s
Claim, she reconfigures the Lacanian interpretation of the Antigone
myth no longer as the paradigm of an ethical impasse as it was read
in Lacan’s Seminar VII, but as the paradigmatic metaphor of ‘political
catachresis’, a myth which allows us to see how the very intelligibility
of the human can always be reconfigured in view of a hopeful, salutary
political future:
If kinship is the precondition of the human, then Antigone is the occasion for
a new field of the human, achieved through political catachresis, the one that
happens when the less than human speaks as human, when gender is displaced,
and kinship founders on its founding laws. She acts, she speaks, she becomes one
for whom the speech act is a fatal crime, but this fatality exceeds her life and enters
the discourse of intelligibility as its own promising fatality, the social form of its
aberrant, unprecedented future. (AC, 82)
Butler’s project can thus be characterized as the queer project of
inclusionary, hopeful interrogation of sexuality (and kinship, and
gender) as a ‘regime of truth’ that can and ought to be perpetually
reconfigured, so that the marginal, the aberrant, the excluded can
‘enter the discourse of intelligibility’.
What of sexual difference then? Well, insofar as in Butler’s way
of understanding it, it acts either as a normative barrier erected
by a policing discourse seeking to circumscribe the limits of social
and sexual acceptability, or as a discursive after-effect reifying itself as
prediscursive law, Butler misses the Lacanian point completely. I turn
to Joan Copjec again for a conclusive counter-argument:
When we speak of language’s failure with respect to sex, we speak not of its
falling short of a prediscursive object but of its falling into contradiction with
itself. Sex coincides with this failure, this inevitable contradiction. Sex is, then, the
impossibility of completing meaning, not (as Butler’s historicist/deconstructionist
argument would have it) a meaning that is incomplete, unstable. (206)
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The Lacanian notion of sexual difference as real decisively disallows
the Butlerian gesture of inclusivity and reconfiguration, based entirely
on a discursive understanding of sexuality. What it does allow for, as
Tim Dean and Lee Edelman have argued from markedly different
but equally queer perspectives, is a conception of sexuality that
is inherently bound up with the real, the impossible, and the
intractable—which does not mean, as Copjec again shows us, that
it is set out eternally as heterosexist: ‘Sex does not budge, and it is not
heterosexist to say so. In fact the opposite may be true. For it is by
making it conform to the signifier that you oblige sex to conform to
social dictates, to take on social content’ (211). On the contrary this
conception of sexual difference makes any kind of sexual identification
a necessary failure, which means conclusively that heterosexuality,
homosexuality, and everything in between and beyond cannot possibly
be thought of as anything more than après-coup misidentifications, and
therefore sites for contestation and, indeed, resistance.
But isn’t this what Butler was keen to stress? Is not her political and
theoretical wager placed precisely on the attempt to see sexuality (and
kinship, and gender) as sites of resistance and reconfiguration? What
can we therefore conclude about Butler’s troubling and recalcitrant,
but nonetheless insistent and in key respects rigorous, engagement
with Lacan? My suggestion is that Butler’s position vis-à-vis Lacan
is clearly not adaptation and reformulation, nor is it plain repudiation
(although after the dialogue with Žižek it would perhaps appear as
such), it is rather a disavowal of Lacanian theory. Disavowal in the
psychoanalytic vocabulary denotes a psychic reaction to the trauma
of castration, a relation to the phallus as impotent but structuring
signifier, a psychic position. I am obviously not claiming that a
complex theoretical discourse is based on a psychic positioning, nor
am I ‘psychoanalysing’ Butler by attaching the sign of disavowal to
her entire work. But Butler sees that the phallus is only metaleptically
constituted as a signifier of sexual difference—and yet persists in
claiming that this metalepsis is necessarily masculinizing. Butler shows
that the symbolic order is only constituted as normative as an after-
effect, and that it consistently operates catachrestically by including
ever more signifiers into its circle in an effort to conceal the internal
fracture of the real— and yet proclaims that in catachresis we may find
the ‘aberrant, unprecedented future’ of the inclusion of the marginal.
Disavowal (also) means seeing and refusing to see at the same time,
knowing and insisting on the repudiation of that knowledge. And this
is not important because it can serve as a facile labelling of Butler’s
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project. It is consequential because this process of disavowal, I would
argue, is what has ultimately prevented queer theory, at least in the
mode practised by Butler, from finding in psychoanalysis anything
other than a normative discourse. At the same time, this process of
disavowal, no more emphatically than in Butler’s case, can be said
to be the very process of queering itself: contorting a psychoanalytic
orthodoxy that is perfectly capable of ultra-normative, heterosexist
and indefensible conceptions of sexuality, gender identification, and
nuclear family-centred kinship, and effectively, après-coup transforming
it into a tool which allows for innovative and productive formulations
such as gender melancholia and the lesbian phallus. Whether orthodox
Lacanians would admit to it or not, I think it is obvious that Lacanian
theory has never been the same since Judith Butler.18
Conclusion: How to Bring your Kids up Queer
‘French Theory’ was (still is?) an American identification with a
series of discourses whose common origin was indisputably philosophy
and whose often grand reach and universalizing horizons nevertheless
unmistakably bore the mark of a radical political engagement. If Cusset
is right in capturing the moment when ‘French Theory’ became
something else in the United States, when it was brought ‘down to earth’
and made to speak to particularizing concerns about identity, sexuality,
ethnicity, etc., then what, if anything, is unique about the way
influences from ‘French Theory’ gave birth to queer theory? Perhaps
the answer to that question, as I have tried to map it onto the discourses
of Sedgwick and Butler, is that queer theory, arguably more than,
say, postcolonial theory or textual criticism, took more risks. It took
the risk of reducing and historicizing a philosophical programme into
concrete strategies for discursive analysis, as with Sedgwick’s ‘applied
deconstruction’; and it took the risk of disavowing insights that were
productively utilized in a radical critique of its parentage, turning
psychoanalytic theory against itself the way Butler has done. It took the
risks of getting it wrong in order to queer it right. These are the risks
of misconstruing, subverting, or even perverting established canons of
theory which may well be the sort of risks that need to be taken if
theory of any sort is to be reborn or to stay alive. More than that, and
speaking summarily, it is arguable that the same risks of subversion,
perversion and ‘structural misunderstanding’ are equivalent to the risks
the French progenitors themselves took: Foucault adapting Nietzsche’s
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doctrine of truth, Derrida deconstructing Heidegger’s ontology and
the Hegelian dialectic, Lacan transforming Freudian psychoanalysis by
making it speak the language of structural linguistics. Perhaps then,
queer theory represents not so much the moment of birth as it does
the moment of growing up, leaving behind the simple transposition of
a mode of analysis from France to the US, say from deconstructive
readings of Rousseau to deconstructive readings of Shelley. Not
despite, but because of these operations of ‘structural misunderstanding’,
of subversion, perversion, misconstrual that designate, as I hope to
have shown, the developmental traits of queer theory in relation to its
French influences, queer theory is not a simple transposition, however
idiosyncratic. Queer theory, and this may yet be its saving grace, is not
a moment, the moment of ‘theory in the States’, it is theory, it was
born adult, fully formed with its parentage disfigured.
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